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GUARANTEED WAGES UNDER NEW YORK STATE
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION
GODFREY SCHMIDTt
AMERICAN minimum wage legislation, after a rather uneven career,became endowed with constitutional respectability in 1937 when
the United States Supreme Court wrote its decision in West Coast Hotel
Company v. Parrish.' Recently the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York passed upon a novel and nationally significant question
affecting such legislation.2 For the first time in the history of the United
States a high court has ruled upon the validity of the so-called "guaran-
teed wage."'
The mere establishment of minimum hourly rates for a given industry
makes no substantial contribution to a living wage, unless the worker
can be assured that he will have the opportunity to work at least a cer-
tain number of hours per week at the minimin rate. Minimum wage
legislation, which confines its attention merely to rate of pay, unrelated
to the length of regularity of employment, does not confer obvious bene-
fits on all workers. This was realized by the Factory Investigating
Commission of the State of New York, which in its Fourth Report
(February 15, 1915) wrote as follows on the subject, "The Relation of
Irregular Employment to the Living Wage for Women":
"In the discussion of the legal minimum wage for women, provided for by
t Deputy Industrial Commissioner, Department of Labor, State of New York.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of the Department of
Labor of New York State.
1. 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937). The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 52
STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-218 (1941) was upheld in United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941) and Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator
of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U. S. 126, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (1941).
2. Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 289 N. Y. 262, 45 N. E. (2d) 434
(1942).
3. "Guaranteed wage" is a term not free from ambiguity. As used here, it implies
units of remuneration (and units of time during which pay accrues at a stipulated rate)
which are reasonable but irreducible minima. Such quanta of remuneration or time are
not subject to a diminution or fraction simply because a proportional unit of service has
not been rendered by the employee. Either the employee is entitled to the full quantum
or none at all. The employer must pay for potential service or for potentially productive
employee's time even if through faulty arrangement of work schedules or for other
reasons no work is available during the given minimal time unit. But the obligation to
pay the guaranteed wage does not usually apply to new employees or to employees who
either refuse to work or voluntarily absent themselves dujing the minimum time unit.
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nine states in 1912 andl 1913, practically all of the emphasis thus far has been
placed -upon only one of the two essential factors, namely the rate of pay.
Almost no attention has been given to the other equally important factor,
namely the regularity of employment. Both factors must be taken into con-
sideration if the working woman is to receive a 'living wage'.
"All minimum wage rates so far established in this country have been
weekly rates based upon the necessary cost of living per week. Such wage
awards therefore really set rates per hour. In effect they say, 'You may have
a living wage for each hour you work, but if you have no work you must get
along the best you can'. For the awards make no allowance for short time
employment. To establish rates which will take unemployment into account
is admittedly a difficult problem. But in at least one country this need has
been recognized and effectively dealt with ...
"The importance of regular work has also been recognized in America. The
Massachusetts Commission of 1911 said 'Regularity of employment is as vital
to the worker as a living wage. It presents another problem but yet one in-
extricably bound up with the qu'estion of what wages are necessary to maintain
the employees of any given industry'. The Massachusetts Wage Board for
the brush industry also saw the-need of something more than an hour rate.
'Any minimum wage finding which stops with merely naming a minimum
hourly rate merely looks well on paper, but accomplishes no actual result be-
yond a somewhat pale moral effect'.4
"It must be obvious, therefore, to all thoughtful students of the problem
that if we seriously desire to secure for working women a living wage we must
either (1) grant them a wage rate sufficiently high to cover periods of un-
avoidable unemployment or (2) devise some method whereby fairly steady
employment will be supplied. Some system of unemployment insurance might
also well be considered in this connection. The problem is a difficult one and
invites the serious attention of those interested in the welfare of working
women."
5
The "guaranteed wage" is a step, and indeed a very small step in the
direction of devising "some method whereby fairly steady employment
will be supplied." A few employers in the United States have been able
to develop guaranteed wages on an annual basis.6 Such a plan simply
4. FouRr REP. FACTORY INVESTIGATING Comm¢. oF N. Y. (1915) 505. (Italics in original
report.)
5. Id. at 507.
6. Among the rare employers offering plans for guaranteeing income or employment
are: Proctor and Gamble Co., Cincinnati, soap manufacturers; Nunn-Bush Shoe Co.,
Milwaukee, manufacturer of men's shoes, 3000 workers; George A. Hormel & Co., Austin,
Minn., meat packers, 1000 workers; The Columbia Conserve Co., 3000 workers.
In addition annual wage or guaranteed employment provisions were contained in only
14 out of several thousand union agreements on file in the Bur. of Labor Statistics in
1943]
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means a minimum wage in relation to a relatively long unit of time, a
year. Unfortunately, most industries are not in a position, what with
unpredictable economic conditions and their uncertain financial status,
to commit themselves to minimum annual wage schemes. Industry's
reluctance in this respect would probably be roughly proportionate to
the length of the time unit involved. Guaranteed wages on an hourly
or even daily basis furnish no outstanding difficulty. The difficulties
begin to multiply, however, once the week or the month or a longer
period is used. State minimum wage statutes do not expressly authorize
a single, fixed unit of time for the computation of wages.
Article 19 of the New York State Labor Law exemplifies the general
principles of most living wage legislation in the United States. Usually,
such statutes provide for the establishment of minimum wage standards
for women and minors and not for men.7 The New York statute will
be used as a convenient model for discussion. Selection of the wage rate
and the time unit to which it is related is usually the result of an elabo-
rate administrative process which includes the following steps:
1. Field investigation of the economic areaP involved by persons
trained in statistical methods and economic research. Wide statutory
powers of investigation and subpoena are designed to prevent economic
analysis from being curtailed through lack of voluntary cooperation
from employers and others in possession of data and information on
wages and working conditions.
2. Convocation of an advisory board, comprising representatives of
the public and of employers and employees in the occupation under
1940. They affected only 5000 workers. 11 HANDBOOK or LABOR STATISTICS (U. S. Dep't
Labor, Bur. of Labor Statistics 1941) 367 et seq. See also Annual Wage and Guaranteed
Employment Plans (1938) 47 MONTmLY LABOR REViEW 52; Annual Wage and Guaranteed
Employment (1940) 51 MONTHLY LABOR Raviaw 283.
7. Most of the state laws apply to women and minors, the exception being the Connec-
ticut and Hawaii Acts, which also apply to men. The Oklahoma Law was also written
to cover men, women and minors but because of a defective title the minimum-wage
provisions of the act cannot be applied to men and minors; enforcement of the orders
for women is prevented by injunction. See State Minimum Wage Laws and Orders: 1942
U. S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Bureau Bull. 191.
8. Golding, The Industry Committee Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(1941), 50 YAE L. J. 1141, 1151 sub-heading "Selection and Delineation of the 'Industry'"
9. N. Y. LABOR LAw § 553: "The Commissioner shall have power . . . To enter the
place of business ... of any employer of women and minors . .. for the purpose of exam-
ining and inspecting any and all books, registers, payrolls and other records . . . that in
any way appertain to or have a bearing upon . . . wages . . ." No administrative diffi-
culties have been experienced in the enforcement of this section.
[Vol. 12
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consideration. To this b6ard the Labor Department submits a report
detailing the results of investigation into the wages and working condi-
tions of the industry."°
3. Study, debate and deliberation by the Wage Board, which results
in the formulation of wage standards and the final submission of recom-
mendations to the promulgating authority in the form of a proposed
wage order." A Wage Board has power to make its own investigation, to
conduct hearings of witnesses and experts.
4. Consideration of the recommendations of the wage board, by the
promulgating authority, the Industriab Commissioner, who may accept
or reject the recommendations. If they are rejected, the problem may
be submitted to the same or to a new wage board. 2
5. If the recommendations are accepted, a public hearing is con-
vened for the purpose of giving interested persons an opportunity to
express approval or disapproval of the proposed wage order.'3 Copies
of the proposed wage order are furnished to anyone on request and are
also mailed to practically every employer in the industry. Proceedings
at the public hearing are recorded stenographically, and there is an
10. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 556, ,(1-2): "A wage board shall- be composed of not more
than three representatives of employers, an equal number of representatives of employees
and of not more than three disinterested persons representing the public. . . .The com-
missioner shall appoint the members of such wage board, the representatives of the em-
ployers and employees to be selected so far as practicable from nominations submitted
by employers and employees in such occupation or occupations. . . . The commissioner
shall present to a wage board'. all .. . the information in his possession relating to
the wages of women and minor workers . . . and all other information which he may
deem revelant. . . ." For a discussion of group interests as sources of public policy and
for a recent appraisal of representative advisory committees and their role in administra-
tive regulation, see LEISERsON, ADzMn =ITAxvE REGULATION, A STUDY Or REPRESENTATIVE
INTERESTS (1942). See also Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule Making (1939) 52
HARv. L. REv. 259.
11. The Confectionery Minimum Wage Board first met on Monday, August 8, 1938.
Its deliberations involved 18 sessions in all, the last on Friday, October 7, 1938. The
minutes of these meetings (comprising a redaction of the verbatifn minutes of actual
discussion) are spread over 140 pages or 421 folios of the printed record on appeal. Some
of the most heated discussion was "off the record".
12. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 557 (1): "A wage board shall submit its report and recom-
mendations to the commissioner who shall within ten days thereafter accept or reject such
report. . . . If the report is rejected the commissioner shall resubmit the matter to the,
same wage board or to a new wage board .. " 1
13. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 557 (1): " . . If the report is accepted ...The commissioner
shall give notice of a public hearing to be held not sooner than fifteen nor later than thirty
days after such publication at which all persons in favor of or opposed to the recom-
mendations contained in such report or in such proposed regulations, may be heard."
19431
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opportunity to file written briefs or letters of criticism or suggestion for
a period of several weeks after the final public hearing. Usually hearings
are conducted in three or four different communities, such as New York
City, Buffalo, Rochester and Albany.
6. Consideration of the proposed wage order in the light of materials
and information elicited by reason of the public hearings; and promul-
gation -of a "directory order". 4
7, After the directory minimum wage order has been in effect for
at least three months, the Industrial Commissioner may review the en-
forcement experience as recorded by the Enforcement Bureau of the
Division of Women in Industry and Minimum Wage. 5 Additional re-
search materials and studies are prepared by the Research Bureau staff
for the purpose of determining whether or not there is such persistent
non-observance of the directory order as constitutes a threat to the
maintenance of the established minimum wage standards. If the Com-
missioner is of the opinion that there is such non-observance, he gives
notice of intention to make the order "mandatory", after a public hearing
at which all persons in favor of or opposed to a mandatory order may
be heard.
14. N. Y, LABOR LAW § 557 (2): "Within thirty days after such hearing the commis-
sioner shall approve or disapprove the report of the wage board. . . . If the report is
approved the commissioner shall make a directory order which shall define minimum
wage rates in the occupation or occupations as recommended in the report of the wage
board. . . ." Under a directory order, punishment of the recalcitrant employer involves
publication of his name for failure to observe the provisions of the minimum wage order.
If at any time after a directory order has been in effect for three months, the commis-
sioner is of the opinion that the persistent non-observance of such order by. one or more
employers is a threat to the maintenance of minimum wage standards, the order may be
made mandatory, ih which case an employer failing to pay the rates applicable under the
minimum wage order is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is" subject to a fine
of not less than $50 or more than $200 or imprisonment or both. Each failure to pay
any employee in any one week the rate applicable under a minimum-wage order may then
constitute a separate offense. See Comment, Notice and Hearing in Minimunm Wage Legis-
lation (1939) 24 WAsH. U. L. Q. 233.
15. N. Y. LABOR' LAW § 559: ". . . at any time after a directory minimum wage order
has been in effect for three months, . . . the commissioner may give notice of his intention
to make such order mandatory and of a public hearing . . . at which all persons in favor
of or opposed to a mandatory order may be heard. . . ." An analysis of inspection records
and of sworn payrolls submitted by employers is made to determine the extent of com-
pliance among employers; where the percentage of firms complying with the law is so
low as to constitute a threat to the maintenance of minimum wage standards in the
industry, a mandatory order is usually deemed necessary. Davis, The Requirement of
Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process (1942) 51 YaLE L. J. 1093.
[Vol. 12
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8. Finally, promulgation of a mandatory order or of a decision to
retain the directory order with or without modification. 16
By statute,17 the Industrial Commissioner and the Wage Board are
permitted to consider the following norms or criteria in developing a
minimum wage:
a) Amount sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to pro-
tect health.
b) The value of the service or class of service rendered.
c) Wages paid in the state for work of like or comparable char-
acter.
On questions of fact arising under Article 19 of the Labor Law the
finding of the Commissioner is final. 8 Questions of reasonableness and
validity are, however, reviewable by the State Board of Standards and
Appeals, and thereafter directly by the Appellate Division, Third Judicial
Department on any. question of law involved.
The preliminary research before convocation of a wage board is pains-
takingly detailed and time consuming. It comprises two phases. In the
first place there is the annual cost-of-living survey which estimates in
dollars and cents the expenses involved in the adequate maintenance
and protection of the health of women workers in the state. A whole
staff of trained research people work on this project for approximately
six months, for the purpose of transmuting the abstract living wage idea
into concrete and specific information for wage board use. In order
to guide the research in this phase, there is prepared as accurately as
possible a list of the goods and services which reasonably exemplify
what is meant by adequate maintenance. Then a corps of field investi-
gators report the prices that have to be paid for all of these items in
the significant towns and cities of the state. To meet the requirements
of law, the budget thus prepared must be adequate and not merely an
emergency.standard. Such a budget should make the woman worker
independent of social case work or philanthropic agencies. The clothing
budget must provide for modest but current wardrobe needs. The food
budget must be proportionate to the needs of good health over long
periods. In short, the budget must cover all the needs of self-support.
The commodity-quantity budget' 9 is different for a woman living as
16. Comment, Wage-Fixing by Administrative Agencies-Legislative or Judicial? (1939)
27 GEo. L. J. 486.
17. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 555.
18. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 562.
19. The services of experts on housing, dietetics and the other elements of the cost of
19431
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a member of a family and for a woman who lives alone. Research has
shown, too, that it differs somewhat in metropolitan and in rural areas.
Such a budget includes literally hundreds of items under the general
headings of housing, fuel and light, food, household equipment and sup-
plies, clothing up-keep, personal and medical care, leisure time activities,
transportation and other living essentials. Since cost-of-living surveys
are made each year they include a description of the adjustments made
in the list of goods and services, and of the changes of prices as com-
pared with previous years. Finally, there is a tabulation of the annual
cost of adequate maintenance and protection of health for a woman
worker living as a member of a family and another for a woman worker
living alone. For the year 1939 (which is the one involved in the Court
of Appeals decision under discussion) the total annual cost in New
York State was estimated at $1,059.68 for a woman living as a member
of a family, and $1,160.75 for a woman living alone.
The second phase of the economic and statistical research which is
preliminary to the meeting of a wage board, takes the form of an eco-
nomic and statistical report (of the Industrial Commissioner to the
minimum wage board) relating to wages and other conditions of em-
ployment for women and minors in the industry under consideration.
For the confectionery industry the report comprised some,245 printed
pages in the record on appeal and included 31 tables.20 Obviously, such
living are requisitioned to estimate a commodity quantity budget. Cf. U. S. Dep't of
Agric., Bureau of Home Economics, Bulletins; Factors to be Considered in Preparing
Minimum Wage Budgets for Women, U. S. Dep't df Labor, Women's Bureau (1937);
Quantity Budgets for Basis Maintenance and Emergency Standards of Living, W.P.A.,
Division of Social Research, Series I, No. 21 (1936) ; Intercity Differences in Costs of Living
in March 1935, 59 Cities, W.P.A., Division of Social Research, Research Monograph XII,
1937; Money Disbursements of Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, 1934-36, Bur. of
Labor Statistics, Bulls. No. 636-641 (1939-1941); Study of Consumer Purchases, Bur. of
Labor Statistics, Bulls No. 642-649 (1939-1941).
Obviously no two consumers are maintained in life by identical budgets involving exactly
equal quantities of the same commodities. It therefore becomes necessary for the experts
to agree upon a budget which can be considered representative- for the class of people
involved. Such a budget can at best be only a well advised guess which relies heavily on
statistical averages. When one considers the number of experts involved both for the
purpose of formulating a commodity quantity budget and for the later purpose of checking
the costs of those items which are listed in the budget, it becomes apparent that private lid-
gants who wish to dispute 'the cost-of-living survey are in practically all cases poorly
equipped to do so. Such litigants may come prepared with rather detailed knowledge of
their own operations but only rarely will they have been able to gather data from a fair
sample of persons throughout the State on the subject of cost-of-living.
20. Here again, it is obvious that litigants who seek to challenge the bases on which a
[Vol. 12
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a report can usually be based on the study of only a fair sample of the
industry. In the case of the confectionery industry 6rder, the sample
studied included approximately 50% of both women employees and
establishments. Wage.and hour data were collected for 3,968 women and
157 boys under 21 years employed in the actual production of confec-
tionery or in the maintenance of the plant. In all, 119 plants were tabu-
lated in the sample._ These plants were distributed in 17 different com-
munities of the state.2 Wage and hour data were transcribed directly
from the records of employers and general information regarding busy
and slack months, methods of stabilizing employment and other prob-
lems of the industry were obtained through interviews.22 The period
selected for study was the first week in December because at that time
in the confectionery industry the production reaches its peak and all
types of plants and workers can be included in the sample.'
Some idea of the detail and scope of the Commissioner's report to the
Wage Board is useful and can be gathered from a cursory review of
the outstanding items on the table of contents. .In the first place, there
is a statement of the facts and circumstances indicating the need for
investigation of wages and working conditions in the confectionery in-
dustry. Previous wage regulation history is reviewed. The findings and
conclusions revealed by previous research studies are summarized. Re-
quests by workers and employers for wge controls are noted. In the
second place, the importance of the industry is indicated by a study of
its size and by comparison with the same industry in other states. In this
connection the characteristics of the industry as to types of product, size
and distribution of plants, and types of firm are reviewed. In the third
wage order is predicated would be put to huge expense to prepare an exhaustive study,
by modern research and statistical methods, of the involved industry. For all practical
purposes preparation under private auspices of a report like the one usually prepared by
the Research Bureau of the Division of Women in Industry and Minimum Wage is out
of the question. The collaboration of scores of field representatives is only a prelude to
the work of etonomic and statistical analyses by which the gathered data are marshalled.
The question whether such a report as prepared by numerous departmental employees
should be excluded as hearsay has not been formally raised or decided under the New
York State Minimum Wage Law. It would seem that in line with the non-technical
character of evidentiary rules before administrative tribunals, such hearsay evidence is
admissible. It is the type of evidence which in the ordinary business of life motivates seri-
ous decisions by responsible persons.
21. Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Record on Appeal, folios 512, 515,
749-761.
22. Ibid. folios 763-767.
23. Ibid. folios 517.
19431
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place, the scope and method of investigation is described and the various
branches of the industry are classified for statistical and other purposes
in order to make references accurate. Hourly, weekly and annual earn-
ings by plant, product, occupation and type of worker. 'This includes
results of interviews with workers and management.
Then, the problem of seasonality comes in for careful analysis, as
well as the sanitary and health conditions, the hours, wages and working
conditions of male minors and incidental problems like deductions from
wages for uniforms or other charges. Finally, the summary and con-
clusions of the whole economic report are set forth. 4
Up to the present, the following wage orders have been issued under
the New York State Minimum Wage Law: Mandatory Order No. 1
Governing Minimum Wages in Laundry Occupations; Mandatory Order
No. 2 Governing Minimum Wages in Beauty Occupations; Directory
Order No. 3 Governing Minimum Wages in the Confectionery Industry;
Directory Order No. 4 Governing Minimum Wages in the Cleaning and
Dyeing, Industry; Directory Order No. 5 Governing Minimum Wages
in the Restaurant Industry; Directory Order No. 6 Governing Minimum
Wages in the Hotel Industry. In addition, the Division of Women in
Industry' and Minimum Wage is completing its studies of the Retail
Trades Industry with a view to the promulgation of a wage order for
that industry. The laundry order which heads the list just given con-
tains the first guaranteed wage clause in the American history of mini-
mum wage legislation. It reads:
"The minimum weekly wage shall be $14.00 in Zone 1 for such employees
who have been employed at all in any given week." 25
24. Ibid. folios 710-712: "Information regarding hourly and weekly wages was obtained
for the week of December 1, 1937, a week which was the peak of the busy season for
most firms in the confectionery industry. Hourly wages represent the lowest common de-
nominator of what the employer pays and what the employee receives for her services.
Median hourly wages of the 3464 women for whom this information was available were
38 cents; that is, half the women earned more and half less than this amount. The largest
single group of women, 31 per cent, earned between 35 and 40 cents an hour. While 13
per cent had wages of 50 cents or more per houi, 7 per cent, or 232 women, received less
than 25 cents an hour. Nine women were paid less than 15 cents an hour." This is quoted
as an example of some of the "conclusions" of the departmental confectionery record.
25. The remaining parts of this Wage Order are given over to definitions and so-called
"administrative regulations". These have an unfortunate tendency to multiply complica-
tions, apparently because the draftsmen concentrate on an effort to avoid gaps in coverage.
Both the employer and employee representatives are concerned with such gaps because of
the competitive advantages and cost differentials which may result.
[Vol. 12
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In the Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. case the Court of Appeals ruled
upon a guaranteed wage provision reading as follows:
"A. Period September 1 to April 1
1. Employment for three days or less in any work week containing three or
more work days, entitles an employee to at least $10.00 wages for that week.
2. If employee is called to work on the fourth day, regardless of whether she
works or not, that will be considered a full day of eight hours, and she
will receive compensation of at least $11.20 for four work days.
3. Employment during more than four work days in any week entitles em-
ployee to a minimum compensation of at least $11.20 plus 35l for each
hour worked beyond the fourth work day up to and including the 40th
hour." 26
It will be noted that the significant feature of this type of wage order
provision is the requirement that employers pay employees, if hired at
all, for a certain minimal number of hours or days per week, regardless
of whether the employee actually works during that time and regardless
of whether work is available during the period. 7
Such sub-legislation amounts to another notable modification of the
employment contract by legal rule.' There is, of course, no require-
ment upon any employer that he hire anyone. However, if the employer
26. Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Record on Appeal, Exhibit A.
27. Obviously the reasonableness of such a rule must depend upon the individuating
circumstances of the industry as a whole and not on the particular plant to which the
order is to be applied. Thus the inquiry would have to be whether, in the long run
average, the irreducible minimum unit of pay would be matched, on the employees part,
by services for which the employer would wish to pay. If the irreducible unit of pay is
too large in relation to the actual service of the employee, the employer's demand curve
will be affected so that fewer workers will be hired. It is impossible in social legislation
to adjust the rule to each individual case. That is for the efficiency expert, motion and
time study analysts, social case workers, personnel managers and specialists on 'planning
and procedure. Sometimes applications for dispensations or variations are in order. [N. Y.
LABOR LAW § 30.] The criterion is somewhat similar to that presented by traffic regula-
tion. In individual cases it is perfectly safe at times to cross street intersections despite
the red light. If, however, the rule were relaxed to permit the exercise of discretion in
individual cases, the social price in accidents would exceed the social cost of obedience
to a general rule not strictly needed for all individual cases. The general rule does, how-
ever, work satisfactorily for the vast majority of the -cases. It is therefore reasonable.
By making guaranteed wage rules too complicated or by unrealistically expanding the
irreducible minima, the efficiency of the regulation to achieve a living wage can be de-
creased to the vanishing point.
28. Hoeniger, The Individual Contract Under the Wagner Act (1941) 10 FoRDHAX
L. REv. 14. For a rather comprehensive view of the modern trends in the so-called com-
pulsory contracts in theory and practice see (1943) 43 CoL. L. REV. 643 et seq.
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in the covered industry makes a contract of employment with a given
employee, that employee must be paid no less than the wage provided
for the guaranteed period. The employee cannot be hired for less" than
a minimum time.
No wage law in the United States, it is believed, expressly provides
for the promulgation of guaranteed wage orders. Moreover, no wage
orders issued under existing laws mandate "guaranteed" wages for units
of time longer than an hour. However, the germ idea of a guaranteed
wage is fairly implicit in the very notion of "living wage" legislation.
The basic objective behind modern minimum wage legislation is to
provide for the necessities of existence of workers who are thought valu-
able enough by employers to be hired to do work in the employer's
establishment. The Parrish case contains the following language:
if the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state
power, how can it be said that the requirement of the payment of a minimum
wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an
admissible means to that end?"'29
But, in the Parrish case the issue was not as squarely raised as it would
have to be raised under a "guaranteed wage" provision.
Reasoning from the natural law to the general conclusion that mini-
mum wage legislation is permissible is fairly easy. The task, however,
becomes complicated and technical when one descends to concrete appli-
cations and one has to make what St. Thomas calls a "determination of
certain generalities."30 It is one thing to say that an employee should
get a "living wage". There are many texts from the social encyclicals
to justify such a statement.31 It is quite another thing to say concretely
and circumstantially that in the candy industry in New York State,
A.D. 1939, the employee who does only one day's work because the
29. 300 U. S. 379, 398, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 585 (1937).
30. "It is difficult to state in absolute terms what constitutes a substandard wage.
Weekly total wages of $31.00, an average hourly rate of $.515, and an average hourly
rate including overtime of $.64 have been considered substandard, while average hourly
rates of $.76 for men and $.60 for women, or rates starting at $.13 an hour and going up
have been held not to be substandard." Union Security and Wage Policies of the War
Labor Board (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 1320, 1327-1328. See also Whether Every Human Law
Is Derived from the Natural Law, ST. THomAs AQUINAS, SUarM*A THEOLOGICA (P.S.) Q. 95
Art. 2; ADLER, co-author, ESSAYS IN THomsm (1942) 205.
31. Cf. PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE selections from Papal Documents Leo XIII to Pius XII
(N. C. W. C. Wash., D. C.) paragraphs 157, 158 (Leo XIII), paragraphs 984-987 (Pius
XI), paragraph 1851 (Pius XII).
[Vol. 12
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employer has no more work to give, should be paid for two or three
days' services.
Fair inferences from the natural law32 and from the encyclicals seem
to support such sub-legislation. But, in due honesty it must be recog-
nized that men of good will might differ from such a concrete conclusion;
and that lawyers with healthy social instincts might consider such ad-
ministrative legislation unconstitutional. In other words, the question
is not free from all reasonable doubt, as the fact that the Court of
Appeals divided four to three, in dealing with it, demonstrates.
When the matter first came before the Board of Standards and Appeals
of the Labor Department of the State of New York in February of
1939, counsel for the candy companies, who argued that the guaranteed
wage order was unconstitutional and invalid, presented several uneven
arguments. They argued that Article 19 of the Labor Law, governing
minimum standards for women and minors in industry, made no pro-
vision, either directly or by fair intendment, for a guaranteed wage for
part-time employment, irrespective of service actually rendered. Fur-
ther, they contended that if the Labor Law could be interpreted as
authorizing the Industrial Commissioner to provide for guaranteed mini-
mum wages, irrespective of services actually rendered, then the statute
itself would be' unconstitutional, on the ground that it would confiscate
property without due process of law, in violation of federal and state
constitutions.3  There was the usual argument to the effect that a statute
which authorized the Industrial Commissioner to provide for guaranteed
wages regardless of services rendered would be unconstitutional by rea-
son of improper delegation of legislative power.3 Finally, there were
32. ST. THoMAS AQuiNAs, ibid. Quest. 94 "Of the Natural Law"; MARiTAIN, LEs DROITS
DE L'Hoiem.ET'LA Loi NATURELLE (1943).
33. This argument was, of course, made before the National War Labor Board's
"equalization" decisions which held that the financial inability on the part of a firm to
pay proper wages is not a ground to deny an increase, New England Textile Operators,
July 6, 1942; Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Co., July 3, 1942. The "confiscation"
argument against social and other legislation has been overruled in numerous due process
cases long before the present war. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934); Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup.
Ct. 505 (1934); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926);
Munn v. Illijois, 94 U. S. 113 '(1876); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57
Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
34. Delegation of quasi-legislative authority has been held to be valid when limited
by reasonably clear and adequate standards supplied by the legislature. Many standards
far more vague and unlimited than those imposed by Article 19 of the New York State
Labor Law (Minimum Wage Standards for Women and Minors) have been considered
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two rather strained claims, that sub-legislation involving guaranteed
wages was in conflict with the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and
that any state statute permitting guaranteed minimum wages, irrespec-
tive of services rendered, would be unconstitutional on the ground that
it imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In the "Factual Background" statement set forth at the beginning of
the New York State Minimum Wage Law there is a reference to wages
csufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health." The
body of the statute frequently uses words like "wages", "wage stand-
ards", "wage rates", "basic minimum wage rates". The State reasoned
that nothing in these formulae expressly or by implication marries wage
rates to hourly wage rates. Only on the assumption that there was a
statutory limitation to hourly wage rates could there be implied a con-
demnation of guaranteeed wage rates which use days or weeks, rather
than hours, as the relative unit of time. Indeed, a review of the history
and background of minimum wage legislation and of the writings of
those who dealt with this subject fails to disclose any reason why the
"guaranteed wage" idea is incompatible with the idea of a "living
wage". 85 Moreover, every constitutional attack upon the guaranteed
adequate by the courts. Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Co., 191 N. Y., 123, 83
N. E. 693 (1908); Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros., 289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup.
Ct. 627 (1933); United States v. Grimaud, 222 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1911) ; Mahler
v. Ebby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283 (1924) ; Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153,
46 Sup. Ct. 452 (1926).
35. In 1834 Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784-1850) who wrote that "a just wage should
be the first condition of an industrial enterprise" included the following in 1 Ecoxo~m
PoLiTrQux CnRETiENNE (1837, trans. by author) 275: "It should provide the laborer ac-
cording to the customs and requirements of the country in which he lives: (1) the where-
withal to exist properly, that is to say, to have nourishing food, clean and durable clothes,
and a ventilated dwelling affording proper protection against the rigors of the seasons;
(2) the wherewithal to support his family, which may be presumed to include a wife and
two children under fourteen years of age; (3) the wherewithal to make some provision for
times of sickness and for' old age. If the wyage cannot provide all these things for the
workingman, it is no longer in conformity with the laws not only of nature, of justice,
and of charity, but even of political prudence. It would perhaps be more advantageous
to the worker not to have work, than to have an insufficient wage."
See also The Development of Minimum Wages in the United States 1912 to 1927, U. S.
Dep't of Labor, Bull. 61. This document, dated 1928, quotes from a statement made by
the Wisconsin Commission in 1919 as follows: ". . . the commission agrees with the ad-
visory wage board that the living wage should be established upon an hourly basis rather
than at a definite figure per week which disregards the hours of labor." The Women's
Bureau criticizes this reasoning: "The second mistake was in presupposing that there was
no alternative except an hourly rate or a 'definite figure per week which disregards the
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wage feature of the candy order could be matched by constitutional
decisions antedating the war and presenting fair analogies wherein even
more drastic administrative action was approved by the courts.
One of the "confiscation" arguments particularly emphasized by coun-
sel for the candy companies dealt with the impact of such sub-legislation
upon the solvency of the candy manufacturers. The claim was made
that if the candy manufacturers were required to pay for services not
actually rendered they would be put out of business, not alone because
of the added expense, but because of competitive cost differentials
which would thus be caused among rival employers. No broad and
detailed factual research supported this claim. Some attempt was made
to supply witnesses who could talk more or less accurately about the
affairs of individual companies. In the oral argument before the Board
of Standards and Appeals, this argument was met as follows by the
attorney for the Labor Department:
"I simply want to call attention to the argument, obvious in this connection,
that no piece of social legislation that has ever been put on the books of any
state or nation operated so smoothly that some people were not hurt. Now, if
your argument is that some individuals find the operation of a given order
oppressive, then I say, it is too bad, I am sorry, I have sympathy for them,
but that is the inevitable price we must pay when we put that kind of legisla-
tion on the books. '36
The Board dismissed the legal assaults made upon the living wage
hours of labor'," (p. 235). There is an illuminating chapter on minimum wage in RYAN,
DISTRUTIVE JUSTICE (3d ed. 1942).
ROLTHLIsBERGER & DIcKsoN, MANAG NT AND THE WORKER (1939) 12-13, in describing
the incentive wage as used by the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Co. Inc.
wrote: "In general, the forms 6f incentive compensation could be divided into two kinds:
individual payment and group payment. . . . Under both plans the day rate, or base
wage, was guaranteed." The same authors refer to a guaranteed wage for straight piece
v~ork and for group piece work. It is one of the "ten commandments" of Western Electric
Co. to pay a living wage.
36. There is much judicial precedent for such cold sympathy. The allegedly confiscatory
requirement of full train crews was -approved in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 269 (1911). An Oklahoma statute subjecting state
banks to assessments for a depositor's guarantee fund was sustained in Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 986 (1911). "This power to fix minimum prices
would have been quite useless had the state been compelled to exercise it in such a way
as to assure a reasonable return on the investment of every distributor in the milk business."
Hegeman Farms v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup. Ct. 7 (1934). See also Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898);
Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 76 U. S. 659 (1878) ; Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U. S.,394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143 (1915).
1943]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
idea by dismissing "commensurateness of the wage with the value of
the services rendered" as a mandatory legal standard. It will be recalled
that until 1937 the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court as
typified in the Adkins case seemed to favor a practically hour-for-hour
proportion between wages paid to workers and services rendered by
workers. In effect this meant that for the ordinary employee, wages as
prescribed by State Minimum Wage agencies had to be based on a ratio
of a certain sum of money per hour. The Board of Standards and
Appeals in dealing with the Mary Lincoln Candy Co. case argued that
the Supreme Court of the United States had definitely overruled and
abandoned the rationale of the Adkins case in 1937, and had, by impli-
cation, 'shorn "commensurateness" of value as a shibboleth requiring
maintenance of a mathematical ratio between a specified amount of
money and the time unit of one hour. Under minimum wage legislation,
prior to the Parrish case, it was therefore inevitable that standards
should be fixed in terms of such a ratio. But in the light of the Parrish
case it was not inevitable or even advisable to limiA that ratio's denomi-
nator to a time measure of one hour. True the Parrish case was not con-
cerned with a guaranteed wage rate, but the Board of Standards and
Appeals of the State of New York discerned in that case approbation
by the highest federal court of the living wage rule: "the bare cost of
living must be met." De facto, the cost of living is not confined to a
merely hourly basis. But the Board went further. Assuming that wages
must be commensurate with the value of services rendered according
to an hourly rate regardless of the cost of living, it posed the question:
"How can a minimum .wage be 'fairly commensurate with the value of ser-
vices rendered' unless, at the same time' it is at least a living wage? Can a
wage which is not a living wage be said to be fairly commensurate with the
value of services rendered without considering the cost of living?" 37
In fine, the New York State Board of Appeals rejected the argument
that only an hourly wage rate could be fixed as a minimum in a wage
year issued under the New York State Minimum Wage Law. The Board
declared that such a contention ignores completely the legislatively de-
fined public policy of the State and the exigencies of the living wage
idea. For the candy industry in the State of New York the Board took
the position that the living wage principle could not be effected if wage
37. 1 SELECTED DECISION qS OF THE BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS AND RELATED COURT
DECISIONS (1941) 144-145.
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rates were pinned down to hourly time units by rule of law.3 8
The petitioning employers had complained that compulsion on em-
ployers to pay wages disproportionate to the services rendered, or even
when no services were rendered, amounted to confiscation. This objec-
tion the Board parried with 'the question: "Can it be said that the re-
quirement to pay a living wage is confiscatory?" As long ago as 1917
the United States Supreme Court had dealt with similar arguments based
on allegations of confiscation, when it dealt with the constitutional ques-
tions raised by workmen's compensation legislation.3 The cost of in-
dustrial accidents was to be shouldered directly by the employer and
indirectly by the consumer. It was then argued that to force the em-
ployer to pay such a cost would leave no fair profit. But the Supreme
Court of the United States answered the argument by stating that if
any industry involves so great a human wastage as to leave no fair
profit beyond the cost of workmen's compensation, the State is at liberty
to prohibit such an industry altogether.
The theory of the living wage is in some respects similar to the theory
of compensation for the injured industrial worker. The consumer of
economic goods should bear all of the expenses 'incurred in the produc-
tion of such goods, including pecuniary losses from death and injuries
occurring in the regular course of production and the living expenses
inexorably incurred for the sake of production. If such losses are 'to be
paid by the worker, he indirectly carries part of the cost of production.
Since it is generally agreed that the expense of work accidents should
be borne by the employer in the first place, and shifted by him in the
form of increased prices upon the consumer, it would seem that a like
logic would apply to the added expense, if any, resulting 'from the pay-
ment of a living wage. Notwithstanding its well reasoned opinion, the
ruling of the Board of Standards and Appeals was reversed in the New
York State Supreme Court and the reversal was sustained by the Appel-.
late Division with no opinion, except that there was a short dissenting
opinion which held the guaranteed wage rule was not unreasonable
because the-statute required the amount fixed to be sufficient to provide
a living wage.
40
The New York State Court 6f Appeals reversed the 'Appellate Divi-
38. Id. at 147-148.
39. New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1917);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 ('1917); Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1917).
40. Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 263 App. Div. 1058 (4th Dep't 1942).
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sion, and in effect reinstated the decision of the Board of Standards
and Appeals. In doing so the highest court of the State of New York
wrote a memorable opinion justifying the principle that the very concept
of minimum wage legislation necessarily involves the determination of
the cost of living and the fixing of a wage that will reasonably cover
or approach that cost. The Court of Appeals referred to the earlier
constitutional history of minimum wage legislation and to the rule of
the Adkins case that the value of the service is a controlling test. The
legislature which in 1937 passed the New York State Minimum Wage
Statute must have had in mind this earlier constitutional history when
it directed the Wage Board and the Industrial Commissioner to take
into account the cost of adequate maintenance and health:
". . . the legislature of course realized that a wage sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living would sometimes exceed the strict bargain and sale
value of the workers' services." 41
Here is the first clean-cut ruling by a high judicial authority which
meets the objection criticizing the guaranteed wage feature because of
its failure to regard the value of the services rendered as the paramount
test for fixing minimum wages.
Equally decisive was the manner in which the Court of Appeals
brushed aside the akgument that rates of wages under minimum wage
laws ought to be linked with the hour rather than the day, week or
month as a unit of time. The clear assumption upon which the plain-
tiff's argument was based was that the New York State Minimum Wage
Law set 'up only a system of determining hourly rates of wages. The
court pointed out that the word "hour" or "hourly" appears nowhere in
the statute. If the legislature provided only for minimum hourly wages,
it would have stopped far short of the goal of a living wage. The high
social purpose of minimum wage legislation would require recognition
of the fact that an hourly rate would not produce a living income, un-
less such a rate was ordered paid for a sufficient minimum number of
hours. The guaranteed wage rule requires no employer to hire or to
pay anyone. It guaranteed no particular employee work or wages. It
simply fixed the minimum amount which an employee 'was to get in
any week wherein her services were requested by the employer. The
employer who in any weekly period calls a given employee into service,
41. Mary Lincoln Candies Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 289 N. Y. 262, 266, 267, 45 N. E.
(2d) 434, 436 (1943).
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is by that fact required to pay no less than $10.00 in the peak season,
or $7.00 in the slack season, regardless of the time actually worked:
"Plaintiffs say that at times they need less than three (or two) days work
per week but that, under this order, they must either pay for services they do
not need and cannot use or go without the workers' services entirely. Assum-
ing that this is factually correct as to 'their industry, we still conclude that
the order does not, for that reason, fail to stand the tests of section 555 .142
The.untenability of the contrary argument was shown by a reductio
ad absurdum. It had been conceded by all parties to the litigation that
an hourly wage rate, if reasonable, is valid under the law. If an em-
ployer is not required to pay for services he does not need and cannot
use, even in the interest of establishing a floor to wages, then an order
mandating thirty-five cents per hour would be illegal if the employer
needed work for only a half hofir or ten minutes. Such logic would not
only invalidate the particular wage order, but it would wipe the statute
off the books for all practical purposes.43
To the contention that the Wage Board was capricious and arbitrary
in failing to pay any attention whatever to the real value of the services,
or to the wages currently paid in the industry, the court responded by
pointing to the Wage Board's Report. The latter contains a passage
to the effect that the wage actually fixed was not high enough for proper
maintenance of workers, but economic conditions in the industry made
it impossible to fix as a minimum wage a truly adequate "living wage".
Obviously, this judicial support of the guaranteed wage feature does
not mean, as the court warned, that wage boards have unlimited authority
to make "extraordinary or whimsical requirements- as to hours and
wages." The provisions of any industrial order must fit into the circum-
stances of the particular industry and employment. A-guaranteed weekly
or daily wage might be reasonable in circumstances where a guaranteed
monthly or annual wage would be highly unreasonable, if not econom-
ically impossible.
Certainly, the assumption that there is something arbitrary in the
guaranteed weekly wage, merely .because it does not necessarily result
"in a precise hour for hour equivalence of wage and time devoted to
* actual work is not realistic. The concept of the living wage is not in-
dissolubly wedded to the notion of service by the hour. The whole idea
of a living wage is flexible. It should not be frozen into rigid mathe-
42. Id. at 268, 45 N. E. (2d) 437.
43. Ibid.
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matical forms, like equations where one member must equal the other..
There is no scientifically indisputable unit of performance, in most
industries or employments. Until one has been found it is illusory to
seek to introduce mathematical precision by clinging to a single chrono-
metric measure. I
An employer who repeatedly rehires given employees after periodical
and fairly regular, but short spells of employment is apparently getting
from such employees values which new employees would not be in a
position to render.4 It seems only fair that a man, who thinks well
enough of a given employee to rehire him after periods of unemploy-
ment, should pay to that employee a salary that will tide him over, if
possible, the gaps in employment. Cost of living inexorably accrues
to the employee during spells of unemployment. The employee is only
available because in some way or other he has met that cost during the
recurring intervals of unemployment. The value which such an employee
represents to the employer is certainly above the value of a new
employee.
Thus, the guaranteed weekly wage makes an employer pay, not alone
for time worked, but, in addition, for the privilege of calling upon an
employee's experience repeatedly, after intervals of unemployment. Liv-
ing is a prerequisite of employment. He who pays for employment
should, where reasonable and feasible, pay for what is prerequisite
thereto.
An argument a fortiori is presented by ordinary practice respecting
beasts of burden. The farmer provides the living for his horse even
while fields are not being plowed. He would lose both his farm and his
horse if he undertook to pay for the upkeep of his beast of burden only
during those precise hours when the animal was doing actual haulage or
other work. As a matter of fact* the overall usefulness and value of a
horse to a farmer is not computed upon so narrow a basis as the time
during which the horse is in harness.
The dissenting opinion in the New York State Court of Appeals writ-
ten by Judge Finch and concurred in by Judges Conway and Lewis,
objects to the guaranteed wage because, in effect, it:
".. . outlaws part time employment with the result that the only alternative
for an employee or an employer is either for the latter to pay for labor that
is not used or for both to be deprived of part time labor that is necessary
for both.1145
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 270, 45 N. E. (2d) at 438.
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Certainly, part-time employment, as an institution, is not more im-
portant than a living wage.46 Only on' the assumption that a living wage
should defer to it may we consider the dissenting opinion valid. There
is another alternative: that the employer will succeed in stabilizing his
employment or rearranging or prearranging his schedules so as to get
full use out of the employees whom he hires. In other words, it should
be possible, in most businesses, to plan work so as to keep employees
busy for the full guaranteed period, instead of using them for one day
and paying them for two or three days.
The dissenting opinion adopts a line of reasoning which, if accepted,
necessarily nullifies living wage legislation. It seems to take the view
that cost of living is a factor which ought to be subordinated to the
,value of the services rendered. To say that the statute cannot be read
as permitting establishment of guaranteed wages for part-time employ-
ment, irrespective of the services rendered, is to assert the primacy of
the value of the services and is to reaffirm the discarded and unrealistic
logic of the Adkins case. Yet the sole basis upon which the validity of
a guaranteed wage rule is predicated is in the sound assumption that
the employee is entitled to receive a sum- of money sufficient to provide
for life, health and morals. It is not a question of employment irre-
spective of the services rendered. It is to be assumed that no reasonable
employer will over the long run, at least, hire workers for whom he
cannot provide work.
Perhaps the narrowest and least justifiable argument by whicd the
dissenting opinion sought to challenge the guaranteed wage rule was
that derived from the "traditional concept" of wages. It is contended
that because the order outlaws part-time employment, the traditional
concept of wages is changed. In view of the administrative regulation
which permits voluntary absence, it is difficult to understand how it can
be categorically asserted that part-time employment is outlawed. But
even on the assumption that part-time employment is-restricted, or even
abolished, it is difficult to understand how the traditional concept of
wages is thereby significantly altered. Such conceptualism is a meager
46. "The relation of employer and employee does not always depend upon continuity of
actual everyday work. In the instant suspension of actual operation the employees of
long standing and experience were 'laid off until work is resumed' oil account of a condi-
tion of fruit. . . We see no reason for differing with the Board in its holding that the
lay-off because of the temporary shutdown did not sever the relation of employer and
employee." National Labor Relations Board v. North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n, 109
F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) ; 310 U. S. 632, cert. den.
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tool with which to deal with unpleasant social realities like underpay-
ments of wages. I I
Finally, it would appear that the dissenting opinion is needlessly
technical when it bases opposition to the guaranteed wage idea upon a
"principle" of statutory construction that such a power is not to be
inferred from ambiguous language. Certainly the statutory language
does not specifically describe a guaranteed wage standard, nor does it
use the words "guaranteed wages". But this failure to describe particu-
lar administrative mechanisms for the implementation of the living wage
rule is the direct result of the generality of the statute. It speaks of
minimum wage "rates" or minimum wage "standards" throughout. Such
formulae are not properly called ambiguous. If they can be made to
mean many reasonable things-and they can-certainly the legislature
must have known at least that much. In other words, all of the things
that they can reasonably mean are within the legislative intent when
the definitions of the latter are measured by the declaration of legislative
purpose. Ambiguity of language is a defect in a statute only when one
of the meanings which can be attached to the words used is clearly or
probably outside of the legislative intent. The general power to impose
guaranteed wages upon industry doubtless requires the exercise of
trained and well considered responsibility. Many social statutes allow
for wide areas wherein discretion must be reasonably exercised. The
dissenting opinion indicates a fear that if wages may be guaranteed on
a weekly basis, they may also be guaranteed on a monthly or yearly
basis irrespective of the services rendered. It is all a matter of reason-
able proportion and of possibility of adjustment in the industry itself.
There is no reason for shying away from the guaranteed monthly or
yearly wage, if carefully studied, and if factual data and the delibera-
tions of a well selected wage board reasonably warrant such an order
for a given industry. Practically, it is hardly likely that any wage board
or industrial commissioner would in the present unstabilized condition
of most industries affected by minimum wage legislation, attempt to
impose the guarantee for a period longer than a week. But, even
a guarantee for so short a period as an hour can' be unreasonable, if the
hourly wage rate is capriciously high. The same administrative integrity
and responsibility which would operate to guard industry and the public
from irresponsibly high hourly wage rates should operate to avoid irre-
sponsible monthly or annual guaranteed wage orders. The question of
reasonableness is a'question of law, and there is a right of appeal (to
the Board of Standards and Appeals, and to the court) 6n such ques-
[Vol. 12
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION
tions. But apart from resort to appeal, we are here as in many other
fields, subject to the "administrative process". That process is in the
long run only as good as the good-will, prudence and efficiency of those
who manipulate it.
By the case under consideration the Court of Appeals concluded that
a guaranteed-wage rule is reasonably related to the declared and proper
purposes of the New York State Minimum Wage Law. Two questions
were, however, left open, because though they were certified, the Court
of Appeals refused to answer them:
(1) "Upon the record ... are the minimum weekly wages fixed by Direc-
tory Order No. 3 in that portion thereof designated III and entitled 'Guaran-
teed Wages' valid-and reasonable?"
(2) "Are the provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
relating to wages and hours of employment, exclusive and controlling over the
provisions enacted of any order, rule or regulation of the Department of Labor
indicated pursuant to Article 19 of the New York State Labor Law, in so far
as New York State employers, engaged in interstate commerce, are concerned." 47
There remains for disposition, therefore, the question whether, upon
the record, guaranteed-wage rule, in its general operation with respect
to the candy industry of New York, is so wholly arbitrary that it is not
U... reasonably fit for enforcement of the policy of the statute under
the circumstances of the particular employment. 48 Having found that
the guaranteed-wage rule is authorized by and within the scope of the
basic legislation, the Court, in effect, remanded the case to the trial
court for determination of a question on which the latter made no find-
ifig: in view of the facts and circumstances of the particular industry,
are the specific stipulations of the guaranteed-wage rule arbirtary or
capricious? Perhaps the only available ground upon which a charge of
unreasonableness of the New York State Minimum Wage Order for the
candy industry could be predicated is its extreme complication. So
many factors have to be considered in the computation of the guaranteed
wage that intelligent employers acting in good faith can be puzzled about
the precise limits of their obligations under the order. An amusing
incident occurred on the argument of the case before the Board of
Standards and Appeals. The attorney for the candy industry presented
a description of the work and time schedule of a given employee and
asked for a computation of the applicable wage rate. The employer got
47. 289 N. Y. 262, 263, 45 N. E. (2d) 434.
48. Id. at 269, 45 N. E. (2d) at 437.
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one result, the supervising investigator for the Labor Department got
another result and a member of the Board of Standards and Appeals
got a third result., It cannot be asserted .whether any one of the three
results is accurate because of the complex character, of the order, but
the dollar and cent specification of the employer's obligation is neces-
sarily affected by the particular method of computation employed.49
The second question which was remanded for the consideration of
the trial court was whether the regulation of wages in the New York
State confectionery manufacturing industries is a valid interference with
congressional power over interstate commerce or, an improper intrusion
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938. Of course, Section 18 of the latter act expressly denies any inten-
tion of excusing non-compliance with state laws "establishing a higher
standard" than that established thereunder.
It seems clear that the guaranteed wage feature of the New York
order is a "higher standard". The recent United States Supreme Court
case of Parker v. Brown is significant in this connection. In this case
the California "pro-rate program"50 for the 1940 raisin crop was ruled
49. See, Comment, Determination of Wages under Fair Labor Standards Act (1943)
43 CoL. L. REV. 355 for a discussion of overtime rate rules under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The note considers guarantees of specific weekly wages in the light of the two some-
what inconsistent rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Overnight Transportation
Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct., 1216 (1942) and Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp.,
316 U. S. 624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223 (1942). Since the federal statute was intended to spread
employment (as well as to regulate hours and fix wage minima) it seems to require stipu-
lation of an hourly rate of pay.
50. A program for marketing the 1940 raisin crop in certain areas in California under
that state's "Prorate Act". The purpose of this statute was to "conserve the agricultural
wealth of the state" by restricting competition among growers and by maintaining prices
during the process of distribution to packers. The law is administered by a tribunal of
nine persons with the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission and the State Director
of Agriculture, who is a member of the Commission, ex officio. The Commission formu-
lates a marketing program which is enforced by the Director. The cited case arose under
a program which permitted the producer to sell, upon proper authorization and upon the
payment of certain fees per ton, only 30% of his standard raisins through ordinary com-
mercial channels. All sub-standard raisins and at least 20% of the total standard and sub-
standard raisins produced must be placed in a "surplus pool", and 50% of the crop must,
under the statute, be placed in the "stabilization pool". The appellee was a producer
and packer of raisins in the State of California, who sought to enjoin the State Director
of Agriculture and the Advisory Commission from enforcing the program. Appellee had
produced 290 tons of 1940 crop raisins but had contracted to sell 762y tons; and he had
dealt in 2,000 tons of the 1939 crop. He expected to sell 3,000 tons of the 1940 crop at
$60.00 a ton, but was prevented from doing so by the prorate program. For that reason
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to be a regulation of state industry ". . . of local concern which in all
circumstances of this case ... does not impair national control over the
commerce in a manner or to a degree forbidden by the Constitution."
The case is in pari materia in view of the alleged conflict with the Federal
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. It seems to establish a
rule which is apposite, and broad enough to legitimate the Court of
Appeals' decision in' the Mary Lincoln Candies Company case.
he challenged the validity of that program under both the Sherman Act and the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act. The court held that the state statute was valid de-
spite the fact that it undoubtedly affected commerce by increasing the interstate price
of raisins and curtailing interstate shipments to some undetermined extent. Whatever the
effect of the operation of the California program on interstate -commerce, the program
was one which it has been the policy of Congress to favor. Similarly the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act is an expression of a congressional policy to favor state minimum
wage legislation; and the Parker case along with the South Carolina Highway case [303
U. S. 177, 187, 58 Sup. Ct. 510 (1938)] seem to foredoom the criticisms which the candy
manufacturers make in this connection.
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